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Scripting the Wilderness
Wendy Harding
The literature of place poses the problem of writing about what is beyond 
the self—and therefore beyond the immediate range of human experience—
through the filter of human consciousness. This conundrum is most acutely 
felt in writing about wilderness, which, in the context of American culture, is 
generally conceived of as “an area where the earth and community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”1 
The perplexity of the writer faced with the challenge of writing about a place 
where, by definition, he does not belong can be felt in the title of Don Scheese’s 
essay “The Inhabited Wilderness.” This brief text about a hike into Hammond 
Canyon in Utah shows how a particular writer responds to the challenge; at 
the same time, it challenges readers to find ways of responding to texts about 
place, a genre to which the usual critical methods are not adapted.2 The present 
study offers a close reading of Scheese’s “The Inhabited Wilderness” as an 
example of a new interpretative model designed to respond to the literature of 
place.3 Like others of its genre this text departs from a prior experience that is 
personal and irrecoverable and creates a new literary space made of words. The 
text is a montage of what I call “scripts” proposing different responses to and 
interpretations of the land. 
Scheese’s account of a solitary hike in the Manti-La Sal National Forest 
plunges readers into a time and place—an August afternoon in the Utah 
wilderness—in which quotidian concerns seem to be suspended. Is Scheese 
appealing to readerly fantasies of escape?  This seems unlikely given the firmly 
stated terms of the text’s conclusion: “Ruins are the bones of the past, to which 
we return again and again, seeking answers to the most profound inquiries 
about human existence” (352). Unlike escapist travel literature, the essay 
1 The definition comes from the Wilderness Act of 1964, Section 2 (c).
2  Scott Slovic considers this problem in Going Away to Think. Responding to Terry Tempest 
Williams’s question about what ecocritics do, he suggests that beyond specific narratives, 
critics can engage in the work of “contextualization and synthesis” (34).
3 I am indebted to Jacky Martin for his invaluable contribution to my investigation of these 
questions.
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asks readers to consider weighty ontological issues. Still it does not feel like a 
philosophical meditation. On the contrary, it issues a compelling invitation to 
consider places, cultures and concepts as if they formed a coherent landscape 
to visit and contemplate vicariously. At the same time, the text is neither an 
anthropological nor a geographical study. Rather than recounting a systematic 
exploration of either space or time, the writer ranges freely through different 
moments, places, and cultures. Fragments or flights of thought, held together by 
idiosyncratic principles, cohere around a speaking subject.  How does the text 
interest readers in the exploration of places that they have never visited, make 
them empathize with cultures long departed, and then acquiesce to a series 
of vaguely discordant concepts? To try to answer these questions by adopting 
a detached critical stance is to risk failing to understand the text’s particular 
aesthetic choices and its persuasive force. 
To follow the text’s development, to remain close enough to it to respect 
its particular continuity and coherence, this study adopts the hypothesis that, 
like numerous examples of the nonfictional literature of place, Scheese’s essay 
deploys various scripts that readers can trace and take up. The term “scripting” 
highlights the choices writers make, as well as the effect their selectivity has 
on readers. It offers an alternative to the concept of representation, which is 
problematic because it implies that the writer can observe external objects and 
in turn exhibit them to another observer, the reader, through the medium of 
words. Scripts organize in textual form a montage of events, places, people and 
ideas that have occurred or are imagined to occur in real-life circumstances. In 
the particular case of the literature of place,4 scripts trace mental geographies 
in which references to actual places are fertilized by a human response, and 
conversely, mental activity is fashioned by its inscription in non-human settings.5 
Scripts are multi-faceted: they refer to the external world and the speaker’s 
internal experience; they straddle referential and textual space, pointing back to 
past events and creating new encounters for readers in the future. Rather than 
splitting the representing subject from the represented object, the notion of 
scripting emphasizes the interaction between inside and outside.
Scripting place is very different from either mapping or narrating it, 
although these functions may be evoked in scripts. Maps evoke places through the 
application of orthogonal coordinates to an empirical simulation of a particular 
4  The generalizations made in this study concern a corpus that has proved difficult to classify, 
as Lyon has shown in This Incomperable Land.
5 The origin of the notion of scripts as mental geographies is suggested by Alison Deming’s 
perception of her writings as “geographic and mental habitats located on the borders of 
change” (Deming 10).
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terrain. Scripts may refer to traditional maps, but they gear that evocation to 
different objectives. Things that are important in maps—landmarks, routes, or 
topography—receive less attention than the uncharted spaces, the dead ends, 
the accidents, the encounters, or the epiphenomenal features that catch the 
observer’s eye but escape the cartographer’s notice. Scripts transform impersonal 
maps into humanized places. Scripts may also evoke stories; nevertheless, 
their relationship to narrative is far from being straightforward.6 Stories are 
fundamentally concerned with evolution in time, and conventionally they move 
from an initial situation toward a resolution. Scripts are less concerned with 
origins or closure; they develop in rhizomatic formations. Though they do not 
ignore the element of time, they often uncover the past in fragmentary form. 
In contrast to cartographers and storytellers, scriptors organize impressions 
about space and time into configurations of tension and interaction in order to 
produce concerted effects. 
One of the scripts in “The Inhabited Wilderness,” refers to the hike that 
the author took in the Utah backcountry, but it cannot be read as either a guide 
to the terrain or a simple description of events. The trajectory is endowed with 
its own empiric logic: a walker decides to explore a little-known canyon to 
discover an Anasazi cliff dwelling and eventually returns to the trailhead. Yet 
the scripts that start from this referential basis are not only multiple but also 
widely divergent in empirical terms. Their function is not only to describe a 
particular exploration, but also to clarify and problematize certain issues about 
man’s relation to externality.
Scripts are not simple transcriptions or even constructions of events, since 
those definitions posit a distinction and hierarchy between a plane of experience 
and a plane of representation, as well as a constructing subject able to extract 
herself from a chain of events. For Don Scheese, the act of representation is an 
experience as absorbing as the canyon adventure. It is an experience of a different 
nature and in a different medium. Instead of having to tackle the difficulties of 
progressing in the wild, the scriptor contends with the necessities of expression 
and communication. So Scheese retrieves, selects and organizes details issuing 
from the hike, aggregating a more or less wide array of sometimes discrepant 
terms in order to provoke certain reactions in readers. Far from disentangling or 
6 Patricia L. Price speaks of the importance of stories in allowing human beings to connect 
with places: “They would not exist as places were it not for the stories told about and through 
them. Stories constitute performative, mimetic acts that conjure places into being and sustain 
them as the incredibly complex, fraught constructs that they are” (xxi). While I agree with 
this statement, I want to distinguish the formal aspects of narration from those of scripting. 
The distinction allows a better understanding of the non-fictional literature of place.
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finalizing them, “The Inhabited Wilderness” maintains these terms in a state of 
suspension that puts readers in a situation of energized indecisiveness. 
In Scheese’s essay, scripts appear to be deployed ineffectually in textual 
space to evoke an experience that somehow remains inexpressible. This apparent 
failure demonstrates the difference between aesthetic scripts and pragmatic 
ones. The latter are oriented toward action, toward regulating or facilitating our 
interactions with others and the world around us. Pragmatic scripts attempt to 
eliminate information that would detract from their efficacy. The map of the 
Manti-La Sal National Forest to which Scheese refers in his essay is an example 
of this kind of script. It excludes all details that are not deemed pertinent for 
reading the topography of the land. Everything that is left out could be seen as 
subscripts, indeterminate sets of alternative or cognate utterances that fringe 
the selected script but that would detract from its applicability. In aesthetic 
texts, these subscripts are allowed to surface alongside the scripts, creating 
effects such as indeterminacy or ambiguity. Scheese permits this duality from 
the outset with the oxymoronic title suggesting two mutually exclusive types of 
space. Finally, pragmatic scripts differ from aesthetic ones in the way in which 
they configure space. To return to the example of maps, pragmatic scripts tend 
to focus exclusively on observable external features. By contrast, and this is 
particularly pertinent to the nonfictional literature of place, aesthetic scripts 
make connections between the external world and the human subject.
“The Inhabited Wilderness,” is compounded of four different scripts of 
unequal length relating to Scheese’s Hammond Canyon adventure. Although 
pertaining to a common subject, these scripts are fairly autonomous in orientation 
yet together they produce a combined effect. There is a first topological script, 
by far the longest and the most detailed, which describes the excursion from 
the trailhead into the canyon and back. There is a much shorter epiphanic script 
organized around the discovery of the Anasazi dwelling place as “inhabited 
wilderness.” A third conceptual script organizes a meditative sequence enouncing 
concepts supposed to elucidate that discovery. The brief final lyrical script is a 
sustained rhetorical flourish attempting to suggest the import of the previously 
analyzed discovery. 
The first script describes the exploration proper. It is the closest to 
empirical reality and paradoxically, though it is placed under the aegis of 
reality and thus creates the expectation of factual discourse, it also suggests 
highly personal readings of the landscape. The hike’s factual development is the 
pretext for the construction of a very elaborate topological script in which the 
conceptual values brought into play bear only a glancing relation to the hiker’s 
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movements in situ. These values are superscripted upon the hiker’s movements 
so that his successive positions suggest a semantic configuration of space—it 
is in this sense that scripts can be described as mental geography. The first 
visual marker concerns the elevated or depressed status of objects in space. The 
cliff dwelling that is the ostensible goal of the excursion is situated at a lower 
altitude than the trailhead where the hiker has to return to retrieve his vehicle. 
The bottom of the canyon lies below the two previous positions that seem to 
stand for places of human habitation (cliff dwelling and car), although because 
of the waterfall and the shaded area, the bottom of the canyon is described as 
“the perfect place to have lunch” (348), an ideal but temporary resting place. 
This static geography is set into motion, turned into a suggestive scenario, by 
the hiker’s trip that takes him from the security of his vehicle, through the 
idyllic pause at the bottom of the canyon, to a site of perplexity engendered by 
the visit to the Anasazi dwelling, and back to the trailhead. The fact that the 
hiker confesses that: “I regretted that I had not brought my sleeping bag and 
more food, for I longed to spend further time exploring this canyon …” (351), 
suggests that he leaves the ancient ruin and returns home reluctantly, although 
we never know for sure which of the sites that mark his passage in the canyon 
have his preference or whether he is lured by the thought of other, unexplored 
places. This undecidability is reinforced by complementary details signaling 
that none of the highlighted places is considered as ideal: the trailhead from 
which he departs is threatened by thunderstorms, the shady canyon bottom 
has only a trickle of water, and the cliff dwelling is rather claustrophobic. The 
indeterminacy should not be seen as a flaw in the text but as a gap inviting the 
reader’s participation.
The global impression of indeterminacy is reinforced by the alternation 
of bright and dark spots in the description:7 the somberness of the forested 
trail alternates with open vistas disclosing impressive figures such as “voodoos, 
pinnacles and buttresses of red sandstone” (348); graced with the bright tinkle 
of the waterfall, the shady spot on the canyon floor is also marked by the traces 
left by flash floods, and it contrasts with the rock formations “flar[ing] like 
matchsticks in the afternoon light” (348); the “cumulo-nimbi massing” (347) 
contrast with the “blue dome of the sky” (350). This disconcerting scrim of 
7 This pattern of contrasts recalls Scheese’s analysis of the Thomas Cole painting, The Oxbow, 
in his book, Nature Writing: The Pastoral Impulse in American Literature, as does the presence 
of the creator in the landscape he describes: “In nature but also dwarfed by nature, relatively 
inconspicuous, he appears to be conscious of his dual role as dweller in and creator of 
nature” (3). Art becomes a means of inhabiting nature, of connecting the human and the 
non-human; this is just one of the many possible interpretations of the essay’s title.
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flickering light and shadow creates an atmosphere of uncertainty that prepares 
readers for the “discovery” which is the theme of the second script.
Another striking aspect of the topological script concerns disparities in the 
quality of vision associated with the various positions in space. While some vantage 
points open narrow and restricted vistas, others offer wide-ranging panoramas. The 
Anasazi habitat is represented from a variety of angles: from the outside, “glassed” 
though binoculars, it appears as “something odd niched between a horizontal gap 
in the rocks,” or as “a dark slit in the wall,” or “a narrow cave.” The impression of 
cramped exiguousness is confirmed by the hiker’s impression inside the dwelling: 
the abandoned granaries are so dark and confined that the hiker quickly feels 
claustrophobic and “seeking for fresh air and light again, [he] crawled outside” 
(350). As opposed to the restricted perspective “through the small portholes that 
served as windows” (350) that the Anasazis are imagined to have used, the hiker 
enjoys a bird’s eye view of the canyon: “Beyond . . . Below . . . Across . . . Up 
Canyon . . .” (350). In the cumulative layering of that visual mini-script, we are 
invited to rediscover the canyon from the narrator’s panoptic eye and in the very 
place where the Anasazis were supposed to have been posted.
Imbricated in the play of contrasting perspectives is another opposition 
scripted onto the topography of the canyon: that between observed and 
imagined details. Juxtaposed to the precise observations and measurements 
of a scientific investigator, who examines “the five separate structures . . . in 
turn, slowly and methodically” (349), are the imagined scenes of a writer who 
conjures up visions of the “extended family” who once lived there, “huddl[ing] 
around a fire for warmth” (350) or “mak[ing] love and h[olding] ceremonies” 
(351). The cave dwellings appear as both archeological sites for investigation 
and, on the contrary, zones of mystery—“black holes of antiquity” (349)—that 
swallow up all claims to know them. The topographical script invites readers to 
organize spatial values and to respond to the challenge of being in several places 
and times at once. Both inside and outside spaces are amenable thanks to the 
scriptor’s introspective projection and detached observation. Scheese’s evocation 
of the canyon creates one of Alison Deming’s “mental habitats” (10) in which 
the empirically familiar terms of subject, object, and context are deactivated and 
rethought interactively in keeping with each other. The different points of the 
topographical script jointly and collectively create a multi-polar space that is the 
starting-point of the next script.
The second, epiphanic script is based on a series of contradictions that, in 
keeping with my unresisting approach, I will not attempt to disentangle. It is 
organized in two flights of personal introspection. The first response to the cliff 
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dwellings comes when the hiker attains a position within twenty feet of them: 
“It is hard to describe my feelings as I stepped on the ledge that gave me an eye-
level view of the ruins . . .” (349). Instead of representing something new and 
unexpected that would correspond to the definition of a discovery, the speaker 
expounds in a very structured discourse his response to what he has seen. The 
script is very logically ordered, passing from a feeling of “Awe,” to “Respect,” 
to “a tinge of fear” (349), in response to the impression of a haunting presence. 
Paradoxically, the object of the discovery remains if not exactly absent at least 
stated in very general terms: “ruins,” “structures,” “realm of ghosts,” “the absence 
of a human presence in a place where humans had once lived and thrived . . .” 
(349). The second phase of the epiphanic script begins after the full exploration 
of the ruins. Having inventoried the contents of the dwellings, the speaker exits 
in order to contemplate and record his findings from the all-embracing position 
outside and the comfort afforded by “the shade of the overhang” (351). Again, 
as in the previous passage, he focuses not so much on the place itself as on the 
nature of the epiphany that he experiences. He considers all the coincident 
factors attending his discovery—the solitude, stillness and remoteness of the 
site—that seem to converge on the realization that he feels connected to the 
former inhabitants of the cave. Finally, he hits upon the revelation highlighted 
in the essay’s title; he has an intimation of “inhabited wilderness” (351). But 
what does the phrase mean? The canyon could not have been identified as a 
wilderness when it was inhabited by the Anasazis; it has become one because 
it has ceased to be occupied. Is it now a wilderness disturbed by the hiker’s 
presence or a deserted site haunted by the vestigial traces of humanity? 
The impression of having reached a culminating point in the text is 
mitigated by accessory considerations. The first concerns the hazy manner in 
which the previous inhabitants of the cliff dwellings are evoked. In spite of the 
fact that the hiker has visited similar archeological sites and been instructed about 
the early occupants of the canyons from those “institutional, impersonal tours” 
(347), his evocation of their daily life is extremely sketchy and commonplace—
it is difficult to distinguish these early Amerindians “hoping and praying for 
no killing frost, adequate summer rains, and winter snowfalls” (351) from the 
average Midwestern farmer. The elaboration of the “discovery” concludes with 
a series of questions about the Anasazi that reveals how little the speaker knows 
about them (351-2). He leaves the site “with more questions than answers” 
(352), sure only of his urge for further exploration.  
Several explanations could be produced at this point to account for the 
emphasis on his present-day discovery rather than archeological insights. We 
could dismiss the discovery script as solipsistic or as a reenactment of the 
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Eurocentric appropriation of American space. These reductive readings would 
be erroneous because they would privilege one or the other terms in the scripted 
relation established in space, across time, between the Anasazis and the hiker. The 
two occupants of the cliffs seem to be competing for pride of place but neither, 
if my characterization of scripts as tensional structures is valid, can be decisively 
chosen as preeminent. Although the hiker stresses his “special feeling of solitude” 
(351), it is obviously the Anasazis’ former occupation that endows the place 
with significance. The tension in the script between presence and absence gives 
the scene its particular pathetic and enigmatic aura. The “profound connection 
with the past” (351) felt by the narrator depends on the effacement of one or the 
other parties concerned: to imagine the Anasazis living their idyllic lives, one 
has to forget the hiker’s intrusion, but to affirm his recapturing of their universe 
one has to admit their extinction. An atmosphere of fluctuating uncertainty 
defines the epiphanic script. The hiker’s “profound connection with the past” is 
offered as a tentative, stopgap explanation that obviously fails to accomplish its 
function. It is superscripted by the more obscure and contradictory concept of 
“inhabited wilderness” which is the object of the next script.
The obvious, even glaring proof of the expressive flaw in the epiphanic 
script is suggested in the title’s contradictory terms. This contradiction is both the 
text’s focus and its blind spot. How can a place be classed as wilderness when it 
bears the signs of habitation and, correlatively, how can one inhabit a wilderness 
without automatically changing it into a humanized space? That contradiction is 
an enigma that appears conspicuously while remaining completely unexplained. 
In fact, the contradiction is not as symmetrical as implied: if a human can 
choose to inhabit a wilderness, a wilderness does not choose to be inhabited. 
This sounds trivial. And indeed it is trivial until we realize that because of the 
passive voice, it is not so much a question of the act of ‘inhabiting” as the state 
of being “inhabited.” No one in particular inhabits the wilderness yet it is said 
to be “inhabited.” Exactly by whom, the text refrains from disclosing. Is it by 
the Anasazis centuries ago? Is it by the ghosts of those former inhabitants? Is it 
by the wandering hiker who temporarily visits the place? Or is it by something 
else that the text is trying to decipher. The contradiction contained in the term 
“inhabited wilderness” is the driving force at the back of all the scripts contained 
in the text, but the deployment of scripts leads to no conclusive resolution. This 
inconclusiveness is a characteristic of the third “conceptual” script.
What is remarkable about this script is that it offers a string of pregnant 
concepts given one after another without any analysis of their connections. The 
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term “inhabited wilderness,” seamlessly leads to “rewilded landscape” (351)8 which 
in turn suggests the notion of “interrupted space” (352) that glancingly calls up 
the notion of the “sacred.”9 Rather than producing logical links that would weave 
those heterogeneous notions into a coherent discourse, the author admits that he 
had difficulty finding words to describe the import of the experience: “I groped 
for words adequate for the moment as I wrote in my journal” (352). Naturally 
this reference raises the question of the relation of the text we are reading to this 
journal. What has become of the missing text or pre-text?  Is the published text 
supposed to contain the words that could not be found on location? Are the 
words in the quotations that follow “adequate for the moment” or are they the 
sign of a mind still groping? This avowal of the failure of language is perhaps the 
writer’s feint, aiming not to mislead us but to guide us where he wants us to go. 
The narrator’s earlier description of the clinking of shards of Anasazi pottery that 
“broke the silence” (350) offers a clue. This gesture foreshadows the narrator’s 
failed attempts at expression, which also replicates the “crude petroglyphs” that 
are characterized as the “doodling, as it were of these prehistoric inhabitants” 
(350). The fragments and the doodling are somehow, like the essay, efforts to link 
humanity to the environment they inhabit.
In his search for the adequate expression to capture the experience, the 
scriptor lists a series of concepts that seem not so much to account for anything 
as to create a sense of expressive incapacity. He ceases to assume responsibility 
for articulating his own impressions and resorts to outside authorities; he 
summons Cronon, McPherson and Eliade to testify in his place. A quotation 
within a quotation produces an effect of ever-receding distance, as Eliade’s text 
is cited from MacPherson’s Sacred Land. Then, in an ever more remote mise 
en abyme, Scheese mentions “a photograph of an Anasazi ruin in southeastern 
Utah” (352) that McPherson includes in his book with a caption from Eliade’s 
text. The hermeneutic circle is finally closed, but its center is empty or too 
full—there are no words for what has to be experienced by visual means, at the 
heart of experience.
The conceptual script turns out to not to explain but to underline the 
failure of explanation. Indeed, Cronon’s article about the Apostle Islands 
presents an innovative concept that seems to counter the topographical script 
in Scheese’s essay. Cronon critiques the official representation of wilderness 
“as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by 
8 The term is derived from William Cronon’s essay, “The Riddle of the Apostle Islands.”
9  Both the term “interrupted space” and the suggestion of the sacred come from a passage 
that Scheese quotes from Mircea Eliade’s book, The Sacred and the Profane.
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man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” (Cronon 36).10 The 
separation of nature and culture in this legal definition of wilderness matches 
the trajectory of Scheeses’s lonely hike into the canyon and harmonizes with 
his explication of the “rewilded landscape” as: “a place once settled by humans 
and then abandoned, reverting back to, and reclaimed by, nature” (351). By 
contrast, Cronon advocates a new “wilderness area” concept in which the traces 
of human habitation would still be visible: “I would argue for a few locations 
outside of the designated wilderness which, although still managed to protect 
wilderness values, could be modestly restored and actively interpreted so as to 
help visitors understand the historic landscapes of logging, quarrying, farming, 
and early tourism” (Cronon 42). In short Cronon lays the stress on the traces of 
settlement while Scheese, at least initially, seems to be looking for a place away 
from human society.
Is it a case of misquotation, of insufficient documentation, or of a deliberate 
attempt to subvert another person’s text? None of these interpretations quite 
fits, yet the pattern of apparent misappropriation continues. After “grop[ing] 
for words” (352), the author subsequently hits upon a passage in McPherson’s 
Sacred Land from which he extracts a reference to Eliade’s description of how 
the sacred occupies “interrupted space” (Macpherson 123; Scheese 352). In 
Eliade’s study, sacred space is indeed “interrupted,” in the sense of separate 
from “the mundane world of daily life” (Macpherson 123; Scheese 352), yet 
it always remains in close proximity to the quotidian: “For it is not a matter of 
geometrical space, but of an existential and sacred space that has an entirely 
different structure, that admits of an indefinite number of breaks, and hence 
is capable of an indefinite number of communications with the transcendent” 
(Eliade 57). As a matter of fact, it is the proximity with the sacred that gives 
coherence to the mundane. This is in direct contradiction with the definition 
that Scheese appears to favor in his sense of the sacred as emanating from the 
effacement of human presence. In his own account of his experience, awe and 
reverence are linked to solitude. This word, or its variant “alone,” is repeated 
four times in the paragraph relating his thoughts on leaving the cliff dwellings 
(351). What are we to make of the curious conjunction of the scriptor’s apparent 
abdication of authority and his misappropriation of quotes? 
The apparent abandon of conceptual responsibility associated with the 
decontextualization of borrowed concepts converges on the realization of a certain 
10 Cronon quotes this passage from the 1964 Wilderness Act and favors a presentation of 
landscape that would not “remove, erase, or otherwise hide historical evidence that people 
have altered a landscape and made it their home” (39).
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form of eerie transcendence that does not include humans but arises out of the 
signs of their former presence. Scheese’s discovery of the traces left by the vanished 
cliff dwellers is indispensable in his evocation of the special quality of the place. 
His wilderness experience is both solitary and peopled—“inhabited.” He insists 
on mentioning that “there were no other footprints besides mine” (347), while 
admitting that “others had been here before me” (351). He concedes that he has 
experienced a similar feeling of solitude “numerous times before on wilderness 
trips” (351), but insists on a new element, “a profound connection with the past” 
(351). Words or concepts finally seem inadequate to account for the experience, 
and the narrator’s feelings cannot be attached to any identifiable constituent in the 
scene. Scripting becomes a form of abstention, a deliberate reticence. This self-
effacement allows the surrender to pure existence in space-time.
Scheese’s sacred instant is a form of possession rather than an epiphany; 
it is the total absorption in and of the potentialities of the site in which he has 
immersed himself. The site itself is inhabited, haunted by his presence, but his 
personal physical existence as subject has become immaterial, for it has been 
absorbed in the landscape. Indeed, through his imaginative engagement with 
his surroundings, Scheese seems to achieve something comparable to the state 
of being that elsewhere he attributes to ancient cultures: “[B]efore the decline of 
‘primitive’ cultures and the emergence of agricultural and then industrial societies, 
before the alienation of the human species from its wilderness condition, there 
was a time when people felt no need to retreat to a pastoral haven because where 
they lived was where they wanted to be—they were at home in nature and 
felt no separation from it” (Scheese 2002 37-38). This is another interpretation 
that can be given to the intriguing passive form of the verb “inhabit”—at the 
moment when the occupation of space is maximal, the occupier abandons the 
claim to being a causal agent. He both exists and disappears in the experience; 
maximal existence equates with maximal disappearance. Perhaps more than 
other forms of writing, the nonfictional literature of place seems to put into 
relief the interaction between self and non-self that is inherent in experience. In 
contrast to the novel, where place is often relegated to the background, or to the 
supporting role of giving definition to human characters, the kind of text we are 
looking at places the human and non-human at center stage and shows them in 
interaction. Topological scripts become scripts of self and vice versa. 
The final script which I have identified as “lyrical” comes as a kind of 
anticlimax after the first three, for it moves to a degree of generality that seems 
to contradict the questing, questioning restlessness of the previous scripts. The 
conclusion rests on a very emphatic accumulation of parallel constructions, 
each offering a generalization (“Ruins fascinate us . . . Ruins haunt us . . . Ruins 
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remind us . . . Ruins mesmerize us . . . Ruins are . . .” (352). A curious sentiment 
of perplexity permeates the Romantic effusion that accompanies the topos of the 
ruin. Alongside the memento mori theme, the contemplation of ruins seems to 
elicit a curious impression of alacrity. “[T]heir enigmatic silence” (352) provokes 
the paradoxical conviction that they contain important teachings. An impression 
of beauty contrasts with a morbid reminder of bones. The crucial turning in this 
concluding script is the unexpected appearance of the inclusive “us” that for 
the first time associates readers with the speaker’s experience. Whatever lessons 
we may extract from the lyrical finale, it fails to capture the unique personal 
experience that the other scripts have tried to convey. 
The notion of “script” used so far as a heuristic concept needs to be 
further investigated. “Scripts” are the various verbal patterns that reflect our 
interaction with the world and that pertain both to the non-human world and 
to our humanity, uniting both into an indissociable complex. Scripts are not 
distinct from experience; they are part and parcel of our interaction with the 
world. Scheese’s text produces a scenario of facts concerning the development 
of the hike: nevertheless, it is much more than the simple transcription of an 
experience. 
Written expression as documentation or as note taking during and after 
the hike is integral to the initial experience, and this dimension of experience 
forms a part of many excursions. However, once the writing activity becomes 
the unique object of a person’s interest, it becomes a totally different kind of 
experience. Expression becomes an end in itself. The interaction that is at the 
heart of the writing experience is no longer with reality but with the medium in 
which writers choose to express themselves and the situation of communication 
that they anticipate for the finished product of their activity. Written or, for 
that matter, any other forms of expression are experiences in communication. 
These experiences are never sui generis, they habitually feed, like Scheese’s text, 
on previous experiences that are rethought and redesigned in order to further a 
specific communicative objective. 
A few important observations are in order at this point that are of particular 
relevance to the kind of texts that are habitually classified as environmental 
writing, nature writing, or the literature of place. First, even if the written text 
has the status of an artifact, it is incomplete in itself. It cannot be comprehended 
without reference to previous experiences, and it is itself an authentic and 
complete experience that is not resolved in the examination of its written 
content. The written text is more than a representation producing an image, 
a reconstruction or a projection of an exterior reality. The referent cannot be 
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detached from either the context of reproduction, the activity of the reproducer, 
or the reception situation.
Viewing texts as montages of various scripts puts the emphasis on the 
synergy between past experience, the specificity of the artist’s medium, and the 
anticipation of reception. The most obvious consequence of this new critical 
approach is that it ceases to assess or explicate from such exterior templates as 
subject matter, the author’s personality, or generic distinctiveness. In its very 
title, “The Inhabited Wilderness” explicitly announces that it does not refer to 
the exploration of a specific canyon, or to South Western cliff dwelling or to 
the Anasazi culture but to some more complex relation that the text is going 
to investigate. Something strange and exceptional seems to occur after the visit 
of the cliff site when the speaker confesses: “with the ruins at hand and the 
incontrovertible proof of human existence and activity next to me, I experienced 
a profound connection with the past that I had not felt on previous wilderness 
sojourns. I had entered an inhabited wilderness . . .” (351). The ambivalent 
impasse highlighted in the title appears to be the generating center of Scheese’s 
essay. Readers are encouraged to follow its irradiation and circulation throughout 
the text’s multiple scripts. 
While this text is a classic exemplar of the literature of place, it would be 
difficult, except by reference to very superficial criteria like “region,” “nature,” 
“exploration” or “discovery,” to pinpoint the generic features that establish such 
a classification. Although the essay evokes a specific site in the American South 
West, it is far from being limited to landscape description. Nevertheless, this 
particular text offers a sampling of the various types of discourse that can be 
found in contemporary literature of the environment. Description, meditation, 
lyricism or exhortation interweave in one place-oriented text. Far from being 
diversions or interpolations, these different threads contribute to the definition 
of an absent but problematic center. 
What distinguishes the literature of place from the scripts we encounter 
in daily life is that in certain circumstances, not necessarily but frequently 
associated with experiences in natural environments, individuals find themselves 
momentarily or for an extended period of time, deprived of available pre-defined 
scripts. They are left without the possibility of determining how they are going 
to negotiate the challenge of the present moment, and even more crucially, how 
they are going to be affected by the exterior circumstances that they cannot 
assign to any recognizable script. They seem to be cast adrift in space. The 
world seems at the same time too large and too intangible to embrace. These 
moments of disorientation, when presence and absence are felt simultaneously, 
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like Scheese’s experience at the cliff dwelling, lie at the core of wilderness-
centered writing. They are frequently experienced in encounters with animals, 
with extreme or exceptional environmental conditions, or as in Scheese’s text, 
with the vestiges of past cultures, although it would be a mistake to tie them 
down to any specific places or occurrences. 
The experiencing subject is either forced to improvise or to rely on 
familiar conceptual frames such as anthropocentric projections or canonic 
scripts borrowed from science, anthropology or history. These discourses serve 
as stopgaps, makeshift expedients. Although this does not disqualify them, 
they are bound to fall short of expressing the fullness of the experience. The 
challenge of the unknown, the unpredictable or the overwhelming cannot be 
met or “scripted,” that is, completely translated into scripts. This is in part 
the situation in which the speaker in Scheese’s essay finds himself when he 
announces “something about [his] trip . . . allowed [him] to think of it as a 
‘discovery’” (351). The vague use of “something,” the word “allow” and the 
quotation marks used to mark the inappropriateness of the word “discovery” 
indicate that because of the ineffability of his experience, he authorizes himself 
to use an approximation, that its real significance is unnamable. And, as if to 
prove that point, he immediately embarks on a series of conceptual conjectures, 
which in their very accumulation prove that they can, at best, be considered as 
makeshift equivalents. In order to confront the unknown/unknowable, what 
Adorno calls the “non-identical” (95)—that which cannot be matched with 
anything else—writers naturally resort to all sorts of discursive justifications. 
The first reaction is to evoke esoteric identifications such as Nature, Wildness, 
Mystery, Transcendence, Exteriority, or Alterity to evoke extreme but contrasted 
emotional responses such as awe, terror, panic or ecstasy, and to write a 
justification or scenario for their existence. 
Discourse can render acceptable the scandal of the coexistence of the 
known and the unknowable that is part and parcel of human subjectivity. In 
the literature of place, scripts are responses to the inexpressibility of what is 
exterior to humanity; they not only attempt to give it expression but also to 
attenuate the impossibility of attaining adequate expression. More specifically 
than other forms of writing, the literature of place has the paradoxical aim of 
confronting the unknowable with the aim of giving it plausible expression, 
a dilemma that Adorno expresses with particular force: “What in artworks is 
structured, gapless, resting in itself, is an after-image of the silence that is the 
single medium through which nature speaks” (Adorno 96). This analysis of 
Scheese’s essay has tried to show that what Adorno envisages as a silence that 
demands expression is the generating center of the text and the source of its 
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aesthetic dimension. The essay’s multiple scripts draw attention to an aporia 
that might be viewed as a block, interruption or failure in expression, but which 
is, on the contrary, a source of generative power. “The Inhabited Wilderness” 
proceeds to develop from its very cryptic title a series of complementary and 
partially overlapping scripts that all approach, although never quite reveal, 
a buried, glimpsed, or unknown insight. The scripts are like the layers of an 
onion, protecting an unattainable, lost, irrecoverable center. This hypothetical 
center reflects the intolerable pressure of all the utterances that could have been 
produced and that the text has displaced by its univocal and exclusive existence. 
It is the subliminal dream of total expression or ideal expressiveness that the 
text misses in trying to reach.
 The real nature of aesthetic texts is conflictual: they stage a struggle for 
expression and the combat is all the more poignant as they must, as in Scheese’s 
text, present an appearance of composure. Again, this seems to correspond to 
Adorno’s conception of the artwork: “The aim of artworks is the determination 
of the indeterminate” (Adorno 165). The core of indeterminacy at the center 
of aesthetic texts, aggravating as it feels for both writer and reader, becomes all 
the more tantalizing as, exceptionally, in the context of the literature of place, 
it seems to be accessible, almost tangible. Scripts confront the evidence of 
inexpressibility—of the irreconcilable gap between experience and discourse—
while assigning themselves the task of giving it expression. In “The Inhabited 
Wilderness,” “something” literally dawns upon the hiker in the form of a 
“‘discovery’” (351). Whatever stands revealed, “discovered,” seems to be infused 
with pertinence, yet the speaker abandons the quest for optimal formulation at 
the end of the essay. 
The new direction that Scheese’s essay takes in the final paragraph is 
scarcely predictable if we consider that the preceding scripts were devoted to 
unraveling the repercussions of a hike in the wilderness. In concluding, the 
narrator directly addresses readers in a manner that, since Thoreau, is not 
infrequent in the literature of place. He exhorts us to adopt a certain attitude, to 
envisage a certain course of action. This raises the question of the performativity 
of texts. Does the literature of place have the capacity to provoke us or incite 
us to act in connection with our environment? Can texts of this kind have an 
ecological impact? This is the question that ecocriticism has been debating 
from its origin. The notion of scripts can point a way out of the deadlock that 
opposes essentialist and constructivist critics. If it is hard to accept that nature 
is a socio-cultural construction that excludes the non-human, it is also difficult 
to conceive of an essential nature that is separate from humanity.  Scripts are an 
integral part of social experience, and they are also our way to insert ourselves 
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in the world. To script the wilderness is a way to inhabit it, to mark it with a 
human trace while still conserving it. Scripts occupy a middle ground between 
reality and imagination, in other words, the terrain of the aesthetic. Aesthetic 
texts do not clarify or formalize issues; they do not fix agendas; they do not 
constitute political action. Other texts perform those roles more efficiently. The 
role of aesthetic texts is to mirror the complexity of the issues involved in the 
ecological debate or, more generally, in our insertion in the world; they are able 
to show the reversibility of arguments and the relativity of positions. Scripting 
wilderness in an aesthetic text is a way to evade the established discourses that 
fix it in ideology.  By loosening up the terms surrounding the subject, by creating 
gaps and zones of indeterminacy, scripts allow us to begin to imagine more 
responsible forms of connection with place. Scheese’s essay confronts readers 
not with a brief or a message, but with an open, multi-entry mental itinerary that 
we are free to explore or to ignore. It raises questions about humanity’s relation 
to the land, questions addressed both to the Ancient Ones and to the present. 
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